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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH K. BRADFORD and 
TAMMY BRADFORD, his wife, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Appellan ts, 
MICHAEL ALVEY and 
VAUGHN ALVEY, d/b/a 
C. HOWARD ALVEY & SONS, 
a Partnership; and 
MICHAELE. CROWLEY, a 
General Partner, d/b/a 
MICRO INVESTMENT, a Utah 
Limited Partnership, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 16829 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants, Kenneth K. Bradford and 
Tanuny Bradford, respectfully submit the following Reply Brief 
in response to the Briefs of Respondents, Michael E. Crowley, 
Micro-Investment, and Michael Alvey and Vaughn Alvey, filed 
on or about the 12th day of May, 1980. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BRADFORDS ARE ENTITLTED TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
A. At all pertinent times, Bradfords were ready, willing and 
able to perform. 
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There was no finding, express or implied, made by the 
lower court on this point. The evidence, however, shows 
that Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were ready, willing and able to 
perform. 
In October, 1978, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford sold a duplex 
they owned and had been living in since prior to the execu-
tion of the subject Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase, Exhibit "l." They were paid $15,000 down and 
carried the balance on contract, which contract they still 
hold. (R. 406, 407) From working closely with Barney Alvey 
and Pam Tazzer, the Bradfords realized it would be a while 
before their home at Shiloh was finished. Not wanting to 
lose money paying rent, they chose to purchase another home 
located at 902 Potomac, Salt Lake City, Utah. This was also 
in October, 1978. (R. 387) 
In March of 1979, pursuant to instructions from Barney 
Alvey, the Bradfords sold their home on Potomac, anticipating 
the closing on the Shiloh home. (R. 386) To expedite pre-
parations for the anticipated closing, which Barney Alvey 
represented would be "within thirty days" (first part of April, 
1979) (R. 386), Bradfords rushed this sale. They received 
only $500.00 down with the balance ($15,600.00) carried by a 
second trust deed note on the premises. (R. 407) 
Bradfords then proceeded to apply with Mason-McDuffie 
for an FHA loan. In all likelihood, this would have resulted 
in a loan commitment. Unfortunately, because the home was 
-2-
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not sufficiently completed to satisfy the applicable FHA 
regulations, the application could not be processed. (R. 345) 
Bradfords could have sold the contract they are hold-
ing on the duplex and the second trust deed note on the Potomac 
home to obtain the monies for the downpayment and closing 
costs. Instead, they elected to use the $17,000.00 which 
Mr. Bradford's parents agreed to give them. They, at all 
times, had the means to conclude the transaction. They could 
not be expected to obtain and maintain a firm loan commitment 
when it was uncertain when the home would be completed. 
B. Even if it were erroneously found that the Bradfords 
were not ready and able to perform, such performance 
was prevented by Respondents, and Bradfords, were, 
therefore, excused. 
It is a principle so widely accepted as to need no 
citation that performance is excused if such is prevented by 
tne opposing party. Bradfords were always ready, willing 
and able to perform. They did not have a firm FHA loan com-
mitment. If the home had been completed, there is little 
room to doubt that an FHA commitment would have issued. 
Thus, Respondents failing to complete the home prevented 
Bradfords from obtaining an FHA loan commitment. Bradfords 
were consequently excused from the necessity of showing 
their ability to perform. 
C. This case should be remanded for hearing on this issue. 
Should this Court deem the issue of Bradfords being 
"ready, willing and able" to perform determinative herein, it 
must remand the case for a finding on this point. It is not 
-3-
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a function of the appellate court to make findings of fact. 
Rucker v. Dalton, 589 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979); Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 76(a). 
Further, a failure to enter findings on material issues 
is ordinarily prejudicial error. Such requires that the 
lower court's judgment be vacated. Anderson v. Utah County 
Board of County Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979); 
Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262, 186 P.2d 965 (1947); 
and O'Gorman v. Utah Realty & Construction Co., 102 Utah 523, 
129 p. 2d 981 (1942). 
POINT II 
RESPONDANTS ALVEYS ARGUMENT CONTAINED ON PAGE 11 
OF THEIR BRIEF IS NONSENSICAL. 
Respondents Alveys allege on page 11 of their brief 
that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed as 
there are grounds upon which the judgment can be affirmed 
which are not urged on appeal as being in error. They then 
set forth that there were three issues at trial: (1) did 
Bradfords obtain FHA financing?; (2) did Bradfords obtain 
financing within a reasonable time?; and (3) did Bradfords 
use reasonable diligence in seeking financing? 
The issue of whether Mr. and Mrs. Bradford used reason-
able diligence, under the facts and circumstances of this case, 
in pursuing financing, encompasses all of the above. All 
these items have, therefore, been effectively raised in this 
appeal. 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
TESTIMONY OF STATEMENTS MADE TO BRADFORDS BY 
MICHAEL HERZOG SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED. 
A. Michael Herzog was Respondents Alveys agent for purposes 
of this transaction. 
Respondent Crowley's brief on page 16 cites two cases 
for authority that a realtor is the agent of the purchaser. 
These cases are easily distinguishable from the instant case. 
In Duffy v. Setchell, 38 Ill. App. 3d 146, 347 N.E. 
2d 218 (1976), the Seller had an exclusive listing with 
Realtor "A" for certain farmland. Buyer contacted Realtor "B" 
and asked him to approach Seller about the farmland. Realtor 
"B" had no prior dealings with Seller. Realtor "B" approached 
Seller on several occasions but never disclosed to Seller 
that he was representing Buyer. Realtor "B" did as Buyer 
requested and finally negotiated a sale to Buyer at a price 
less than Seller was asking and less than the top figure 
Buyer was willing to pay. Realtor "A" sued Seller for its 
corrunission. 
There were other issues, but the above is sufficient 
to show why the court in that case found Realtor "B" to be 
Buyer's agent. Real tor "B" was not the real tor hired by 
Seller to market the property. Realtor "B" was retained by 
He Buyer independently of and without Seller's knowledge. 
was more than a mere middleman as he actively pursued the 
interest of the client (Buyer) who had retained him. Clearly, 
in this situation, he was the Buyer's agent. 
-5-
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Baskin V. Dam, 4 Conn. Cir. 702, 239 A.2d 549 (1967) 
is very similar to Duffy. In this case, the Buyer hired the 
Realtor to find and negotiate the. purchase of a building lot 
in a given area. The Realtor found a parcel which was owned 
by A, told Buyer that it owned the parcel and agreed to sell 
it to Buyer for $6,400.00. Thereafter, Realtor purchased 
the parcel from A for $5,000.00, sold it to B for $6,700.00, 
and attempted to rescind its agreement with Buyer. 
for breach of fiduciary duty of its agent-Realtor. 
Buyer sued 
Realtor 
countered that it was not Buyer's agent, but agent for the 
Seller A. This was rejected by the court, which found Realtor 
to be, under these facts, Buyer's agent. 
The case at bar is so clearly different as to require 
no additional comment. 
Also, the case of Denver Decorators, Inc. v. Twin Teepee 
Lodge, Inc., 431 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1967) is easily distinguishable 
from the cases holding that an agency relationship exists 
between the seller and the realtor. Denver Decorators involves 
an action by decorators to enforce a mechanics lien. The court 
upheld a refusal by the lower court to allow a witness for 
appellants therein to testify as to a conversation he claimed 
to have had with a representative of a realty company. There 
was not only an "insufficient showing of any agency relation-
ship between the realtor and respondent," there was no showing 
of any relationship whatsoever. Also, there was no proffer 
made as to an agency relationship. 
-6-
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In the present case, it was expressly presented that 
the realtor-Midvalley (Herzog) was the agent of seller-Alveys. 
First, there was an agreement between sellers-Alveys and Mid-
valley for the marketing of the subject subdivision including 
Lot 95. Second, sellers-Alveys were also the President and 
Vice President of Midvalley. Third, the offices of sellers-
Alveys and realtor-Midvalley were in the same building in 
close proximity to each other. And fourth, sellers-Alveys 
expressly told the real estate agent working with Midvalley, 
M. Herzog, to discuss financing with the buyers-Bradfords. 
(Appellants' Brief p. 18) 
The cases cited in Appellants' brief at pages 18 and 
19 involve negotiations for sale between realtors hired by 
the sellers and potential buyers, and are more clearly appli-
cable hereto than the aforementioned cases cited by Respondents. 
Also, see Zwick v. United Farm Agency, Inc., 556 P.2d 508 
(Wyo. 1976) in which the Wyoming court at page 511 stated, 
"A broker [realtor] is an agent of his principal [referring 
to seller] which relationship we have defined as one of repre-
sentation by one for another in contractual negotiations or 
transactions akin thereto." 
Under similar facts to the present case, the Washington 
court held that the defendant-seller knew the realtor and 
permitted him to find and negotiate with the plaintiff-buyer's 
realtor for the sale of land. The seller's realtor was held 
-7-
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to be his agent for purposes of the negotiations. Alexander 
Myers & Co., Inc. v. Hopke, 88 Wash. 2d 449, 565 P.2d 80 (1977), 
B. Proffer was not necessary. 
Citing Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, this 
Court in Downey State Bank v. Major Blackney Corp., 578 P.2d 
1286 at 1288 (Utah 1978), stated, "A judgment will not be 
reversed for an alleged error unless it appears in the record 
that the error was prejudicial." If the error is otherwise 
clear, no formal proffer should have to be made. 
The record clearly establishes that Michael Herzog was 
the agent for Respondents Alveys. That the exclusion of his 
statements was prejudicial is also clear. The ultimate issue 
is why Mr. and Mrs. Bradford did not take more steps to ob-
tain a firm loan commitment. The excluded conversations 
between Bradfords and Herzog clearly go to this issue. (See 
Appellants' Brief pp. 16, 17; R. 372, 373, 375.) Mr. Bradford 
was not allowed to testify as to what Mr. Herzog told him 
about "obtaining financing, FHA." Nor was he allowed to testify 
as to why he never received a loan commitment. 
Again, finding an agency relation between Herzog and 
Alveys was essential. This was clearly rejected by the lower 
court. Any proffer would have been in vain and unavailing. 
CONCLUSION 
Bradfords have been, except for Respondents' hindrance 
of not providing a nearly completed home, ready, willing and 
-8-
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able to perform. They are entitled to specific performance. 
As agent for Respondents Alveys, Michael Herzog's statements 
to Mr. and Mrs. Bradford concerning financing should have 
been admissible. Proffer was unnecessary as the court rejected 
all evidence, the admissibility of which depended upon the 
finding of such an agency relationship. 
Respectfully submitted this~ day of 
1980. 
-9-
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